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REVOKING YOUR CITIZENSHIP: MINIMIZING THE
LIKELIHOOD OF ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR
Catherine Yonsoo Kim
In 1996, against a backdrop of partisan criticism of its Citizenship
USA naturalization campaign, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
promulgated regulations implementing, for the first time, an administrative
procedure to revoke citizenship of naturalized citizens. Prior to this, natural-
ization could be revoked through judicial proceedings only. The 1996 system
of administrative denaturalization, amended in 2000, provided signifi-
cantly fewer procedural safeguards to protect against mistaken revocations of
citizenship. Fortunately, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the regulations on
the narrow ground of statutory interpretation. However, the threat of a rein-
stitution of administrative denaturalization persists. This Note sets forth the
procedural protections that must accompany any future system of adminis-
trative denaturalization: the provision of competent and impartial deci-
sionmakers and a strict burden of proof The Note argues that, if we are to
tolerate administrative denaturalization at all, these safeguards are neces-
sary to minimize the likelihood of administrative error and to safeguard the
fundamental right of citizenship.
INTRODUCTION
To take away a man's citizenship deprives him of a right no less
precious than life or liberty .... I
Few would question that naturalization entitles an individual to the
full panoply of rights enjoyed by fellow citizens. Yet, despite our notions
of equality, a dual system of citizenship exists today. For individuals born
in the United States, the government may not revoke citizenship against
an individual's will: expatriation of these individuals must be voluntary.2
In contrast, for those who acquire citizenship through naturalization,
Congress may revoke citizenship against their will in exercising its consti-
tutional authority to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization. '3 The
disparity in the treatment of these two groups of citizens is in danger of
becoming even more pronounced in the future in the event of the rein-
troduction of administrative denaturalization proceedings.
1. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
2. In 1967, the Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1967), held
that a native-born individual could not be expatriated by Congress involuntarily.
Overruling a prior decision in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), the Court affirmed a
"constitutional right to remain a citizen ... unless [the citizen] voluntarily relinquishes
that citizenship." 387 U.S. at 268.
3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also, e.g., Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654,
673-74 (1946) (upholding constitutionality of denaturalization proceedings on the
ground of fraud).
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For naturalized citizens, Congress has historically delegated the
power to revoke citizenship exclusively to the judiciary; denaturalization
has traditionally occurred through judicial proceedings only.4 Those
threatened with denaturalization have remained entitled to the procedu-
ral safeguards attendant to civil trials heard in federal court.5
In 1996, however, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
came under political attack. Republicans accused the INS's Citizenship
USA campaign-a program conducted from September 1995 to October
1996, which expedited the naturalization process for 1.1 million aliens-
of improperly granting citizenship to ineligible aliens in order to create
voters for the Democratic Party. In the face of these pressures, on Octo-
ber 28, 1996, the INS promulgated rules that established, for the first
time, an administrative procedure to denaturalize citizens.6 These rules
afforded substantially fewer procedural protections for the individual
threatened with denaturalization.
In March 2000, probably in response to a pending class action law-
suit challenging the validity of the new rules, the INS amended its regula-
tions and provided limited additional safeguards to the administrative de-
naturalization process.7 Nevertheless, in Gorbach v. Reno, the Ninth
Circuit invalidated the regulations and affirmed an order granting a pre-
liminary injunction against administrative denaturalization proceedings,
relying on the narrow ground of statutory construction and finding that
the INS lacked the statutory authority to institute such proceedings.8 The
decision did not, however, resolve the further questions of whether ad-
ministrative denaturalization would be constitutional, and if so, what the
minimum procedural safeguards required of such a regime would be.
The INS did not petition for certiorari in the Gorbach decision, and
while Congress has yet to authorize administrative denaturalization
through statutory action, 9 the possibility of its reinstitution persists. In
4. For historical accounts ofjudicial denaturalization and its origins, see Bindczyck v.
Finucane, 342 U.S. 76, 79-83 (1951); Gerald Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in
Immigration Law, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1661, 1694-1701 (2000) [hereinafter Neuman, Federal
Courts Issues].
5. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. Rev.
1141, 1166 (1984) ("Denaturalization offers the maximum process available-a civil trial in
the federal district court."). In fact, in terms of the placement of the burden of persuasion
and the burden of proof, the individual threatened with denaturalization enjoys
procedural protections above and beyond those afforded to defendants in ordinary civil
proceedings. See infra Part I.A.
6. Revocation of Naturalization, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,550 (Oct. 28, 1996) (codified as
amended at 8 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2001)).
7. Revoking Grants of Naturalization, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,127 (Mar, 31, 2000) (codified at
8 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2001)).
8. 219 F.3d 1087, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
9. In 1998, Lamar Smith, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration, proposed a bill to provide explicit statutory authority for the administrative
denaturalization of citizens. Ruth Ellen Wasem, Naturalization Trends, Issues, and
Legislation, Committee for the National Institute for the Environment (June 24, 1998), at
2001] 1449
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the future, political momentum in support of streamlining denaturaliza-
tion procedures may arise from allegations of noncitizen voter fraud.
Calls for administrative denaturalization may also arise, ironically, from
the unlikely camp of human rights activists, who may seek to streamline
the denaturalization process for alleged human rights abusers.
This Note argues that if we are to tolerate a system of administrative
denaturalization at all, it must provide a set of procedural safeguards to
protect the individual's right to an impartial and competent deci-
sionmaker and to minimize the likelihood that citizenship will be revoked
in error. Part I describes the current system of judicial denaturalization
and compares it to the administrative denaturalization regime adopted by
the INS in 1996 and 2000. Part II discusses the threats associated with
administrative denaturalization, outlining the reasons cautioning against
such proceedings. Part III contemplates the possible reinstitution of an
administrative denaturalization regime, and proposes a system providing
the procedural safeguards of impartial decisionmakers and strict burdens
of proof to minimize the harms associated with it.
I. DENATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS
A. The Current Regime of Judicial Denaturalization and Its Procedural
Requirements
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides three grounds
on which the citizenship of a naturalized individual may be revoked.
First, section 340(a) authorizes the government to revoke a grant of citi-
zenship that was "illegally procured or ... procured by concealment of a
material fact or by willful misrepresentation."10 Second, section 340(e)
requires courts to set aside an individual's grant of naturalization upon a
criminal conviction for knowingly committing naturalization fraud under
18 U.S.C. § 1425.1 Third, prior to 1990, section 340(j) preserved the
http://www.cnie.org/nle/pop-3.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (referring to
H.R. 2837, 105th Cong. § 9 (1997)). This bill was ultimately defeated. Id.
10. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (a) (1994).
Denaturalization under this provision on the grounds of "concealment" or
"misrepresentation" requires a showing of both willfulness and materiality. Kungys v.
United States, 485 U.S. 759, 767 (1988). In contrast, denaturalization under this provision
on the ground of being "illegally procured" requires neither a showing of materiality, id. at
779-80, nor a showing of willfulness. See, e.g., United States v. Cloutier, 87 F. Supp. 848,
851-52 (E.D. Mich. 1949) (finding that "illegally procured" as used in a predecessor statute
includes an unintentional failure to satisfy the requirements to obtain citizenship).
Rather, a court must revoke citizenship as "illegally procured" upon finding that the
applicant failed to satisfy each of the statutory requirements for obtaining citizenship when
naturalization was granted. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 515 n.38 (1981)
("Citizenship is illegally procured if 'some statutory requirement which is a condition
precedent to naturalization is absent at the time the petition [for naturalization is]
granted."') (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 87-1086 at 39 (1961)).
11. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e). This
subsection provides:
1450 [Vol. 101:1448
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courts' background power to "correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate" its
own orders, 12 and some courts interpreted this provision to preserve the
government's ability to reopen proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b). 13
As the law stands today, administrative denaturalization is prohib-
ited, and the courts retain the sole authority to revoke an individual's
citizenship. 14 Consequently, an individual who is confronted with the
government's threat to revoke citizenship is entitled to an extensive set of
procedural safeguards designed to ensure that citizenship is not improp-
erly revoked. This section provides an overview of judicial denaturaliza-
tion proceedings, highlighting some of the key procedural safeguards
and explaining the rationales justifying them.
Typically, any facts suggesting that naturalization was improperly
procured are reported to the INS district director. 15 District directors
When a person shall be convicted under section 1425 of tide 18 of knowingly
procuring naturalization in violation of law, the court in which such conviction is
had shall thereupon revoke, set aside, and declare void the final order admitting
such person to citizenship, and shall declare the certificate of naturalization of
such person to be canceled. Jurisdiction is conferred on the courts having
jurisdiction of the trial of such offense to make such adjudication.
12. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 tit. III, ch. 2, § 340(j), 66 Stat. 163, 262
(1952) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (1994)). The former clause provided:
Nothing in this section shall be regarded as limiting, denying, or restricting the
power of any naturalization court, by or in which a person has been naturalized,
to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate its judgement or decree naturalizing
such person, during the term of such court or within the time prescribed by the
rules of procedure or statutes governing the jurisdiction of the court to take such
action.
Id. at 262-63. However, in 1990, Congress transferred the "sole authority" to naturalize
aliens from the courts to the Attorney General. In conformity with this transfer of the
naturalization authority, Congress redesignated this subsection and amended it to read:
"Nothing contained in this section shall be regarded as limiting, denying, or restricting the
power of the Attorney General to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate an order
naturalizing the person." Immigration Act of 1990 § 407(d)(18)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h)
(1994). The extent to which this amendment alters the former judicial power to reopen
proceedings remains unclear. However, it is unlikely that this amendment alters the
judicial power to reopen its own proceedings at all, because the former section was not a
statutory grant of power, but rather a mere savings clause protecting any already existing
power from implied repeal. Gorbach, 219 F.3d at 1094. Under this theory, the amendment
of this subsection would not alter the pre-existing background power of the courts to
reopen their own proceedings.
13. See Neuman, Federal Courts Issues, supra note 4, at 1699 n.214 (documenting
conflicts in case law regarding scope of background power to revoke naturalization, noting
some cases that assumed courts could reopen naturalization grants for any reason under
60(b), and others that argued that this would debase value of citizenship). Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding, in certain circumstances of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly
discovered evidence, or fraud. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
14. See Gorbach, 219 F.3d at 1099 (enjoining INS from conducting administrative
denaturalization proceedings).
15. See Revocation of Naturalization, 8 C.F.R. § 340.2(a) (2001).
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oversee the nation's thirty-three INS district offices and maintain primary
responsibility for prosecutorial and enforcement roles. 16 If the district
director is satisfied that a prima facie case exists for revocation, she refers
the case up to the regional commissioner, with a recommendation to in-
stitute judicial revocation proceedings.1 7 Then, if the regional commis-
sioner determines that revocation is warranted, the assistant regional
commissioner of inspections and adjudications prepares and executes an
affidavit of good cause for the revocation.) 8 The recommendation for rev-
ocation then proceeds through several levels of approval, until it reaches
the Litigation Department in the Civil Division of the Department ofJus-
tice, which initiates proceedings in federal district court.19
Once the suit is initiated, it is treated as an ordinary civil suit in eq-
uity in many respects. 20 Consequently, the procedural safeguards of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply.2' The government must provide
personal notice of the suit to the individual,2 2 who is then entitled to
provide answers to the government's allegations of illegal procurement
within sixty days of receipt of notice. 23 The individual is also entitled to
confrontation, oral argument, oral evidence, cross-examination, disclo-
sure of opposing evidence, retention of counsel, a determination on the
record, a statement of reasons for the decision, and an impartial deci-
sionmaker in the form of a federal district judge. 24 This appointment of
16. Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff et al., Immigration and Citizenship 249 (4th ed.
1998).
17. 8 C.F.R. § 340.2(a). See also Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Operations
Instructions 340.1: Revocation Reports, at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/
lawbooks.nfo/query=jump!3A!27oi3401!27]/doc/{@55687}?/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2001)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter INS, Operations Instructions 340.1]
(describing revocation procedure).
18. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Operations Instructions 340.2:
Recommendation for Revocation, at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/
lawbooks.nfo/query= Uump!3A!27oi3402!27] /doc/{@55711 }? (last visited Aug. 15, 2001)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing procedure for recommending
revocation).
19. Id. (listing the immigration officers to whom the record and recommendation are
forwarded); see also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)
(1994) ("It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective districts ... to
institute proceedings in any district court of the United States .... ").
20. See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 516-17 (1981) (affirming that
a denaturalization action is a suit in equity); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 671
(1946) (same); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1913) (same).
21. Verkuil, supra note 5, at 1156-57 (noting that denaturalization cases are generally
entitled to the procedural protections afforded in civil trials in federal district court);
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Interpretation 340.4: Revocation Procedure, at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/cgi-bin/folioisa.dll/lawbooks.nfo/
query=jump!3A!27interp340!2E4!27]/doc/{@61508}? (last visited Aug. 2, 2001) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter INS, Interpretation 340.4] (discussing
revocation procedure and the applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
22. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(b).
23. Id.
24. See Verkuil, stipra note 5, at 1165.
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a federal district judge to render the decision helps to ensure a fair pro-
ceeding. With tenure and salary protection mandated by the Constitu-
tion, federal district judges enjoy a degree of political independence un-
available to other adjudicators, such as elected state judges or
administrative adjudicators. 25
Additionally, in recognition of the importance of citizenshipjudicial
denaturalization proceedings provide two additional safeguards that are
not provided in ordinary civil trials: a higher burden of proof and the
availability of heightened appellate review. First, although the moving
party-the government-is required to bear the burden of proof, as in
other civil cases, the standard of proof is stricter in denaturalization cases.
Rather than requiring the government to prove its case by a mere pre-
ponderance of evidence, the law requires "'clear, unequivocal, and con-
vincing' evidence which does not leave the issue in doubt."2 6 The Su-
preme Court in Schneiderman v. United States imposed this heavy burden of
proof on the grounds that citizenship is a "precious" right that should not
be "lightly revoked."27 The court reasoned: "Were the law otherwise, val-
uable rights would rest upon a slender reed, and the security of the status
of our naturalized citizens might depend in considerable degree upon
the political temper of majority thought and the stresses of the times. ' 28
Second, while appellate courts in ordinary civil cases review the fac-
tual findings of a lower court with substantial deference under the
"clearly erroneous" standard, appellate courts reviewing a denaturaliza-
tion proceeding will not accord this level of deference. 29 In Baumgartner
v. United States, the Supreme Court reasoned that reviewing courts remain
25. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (providing that "The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office."); see also The Federalist No. 78, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) (stating that tenure protection contributes to federal judicial
independence); The Federalist No. 79, at 505 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano
ed., 2000) (describing federal judges' salary protection, "together with the permanent
tenure of their offices," as affording "a better prospect of their independence than is
discoverable in the constitutions of any States in regard to their own judges.").
26. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 135 (1943) (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 122, 125.
28. Id. at 159.
29. See Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944) (stating that
traditional deference accorded to factual findings of lower court does not preclude
reviewing court's reexamination of foundation for factual findings in denaturalization
case); see also, e.g., Cufari v. United States, 217 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1954) (interpreting
Baumgartner to hold that although a reviewing court should not hear a denaturalization
appeal de novo, its review of factual determinations should be somewhat broader than in
other civil cases); INS, Interpretation 340.4, supra note 21 (interpreting Baumgartner to
hold that the Supreme Court may "reexamine the findings of fact in the lower courts and
make an independent determination as to whether the evidence satisfied the requisite
high standard" of clear and unequivocal evidence for denaturalization). Although
Baumgartner failed to articulate the precise standard an appellate court should apply to
review a district court's factual findings in denaturalization cases, it is clear that the
20011 1453
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bound to reexamine the foundation for factual findings in denaturaliza-
tion cases because of the "gravity" of these cases and because denaturali-
zation cases involve "broadly social judgments-judgments lying close to
opinion regarding the whole nature of our Government and the duties
and immunities of citizenship." 3 °
B. INS Implementation of Administrative Denaturalization Proceedings in
1996
In the Immigration Act of 1990, Congress for the first time delegated
to the executive branch, rather than the judicial, the authority to grant
citizenship to aliens. -1 To conform to this new delegation of the naturali-
zation authority, Congress replaced the former provision preserving the
courts' power to reopen its proceedings32 with the new section 340(h),
providing: "Nothing contained in this section shall be regarded as limit-
ing, denying, or restricting the power of the Attorney General to correct,
reopen, alter, modify, or vacate an order naturalizing the person."3 3 Six
years later, against a backdrop of partisan accusations of improper grants
of citizenship, 34 the INS interpreted this provision to authorize adminis-
standard requires more careful scrutiny than the "clearly erroneous" standard accorded in
ordinary civil trials.
30. Baumgartner, 322 U.S. at 671.
31. Immigration Act of 1990 § 401(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (a) (1994) ("The sole authority
to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States is conferred upon the Attorney
General.").
32. See supra notes 11-12.
33. Immigration Act of 1990 § 407(d) (18) (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(h) (1994) (emphasis
added).
34. House Policy Committee, Policy Perspective, Clinton Administration's Own
Verdict: Damage from "Citizenship USA" Can Never Be Undone (May 12, 1997) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter House Policy Committee, Policy Perspective]
(criticizing the Citizenship USA campaign); see also Ruth Larson, INS Halts Rush to
Citizenship After Election, FBI Clearance Now Comes First, Wash. Times, Dec. 4, 1996, at
Al (reporting harsh criticism of Citizenship USA by Republican lawmakers and governors,
who claimed that "the INS allowed convicted felons to become citizens in a rush to
naturalize more than a million potential voters before the election," and that the INS
would use administrative denaturalization to correct any wrongdoing associated with the
campaign); Valerie Alvord, San Diego Residents Will be First to Lose Citizenship Under
New Law, Copley News Service, Dec. 15, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, COPNWS File
(reporting that the INS implemented administrative denaturalization to "stem problems
associated with Citizenship USA").
While many reports characterize the INS's institution of administrative
denaturalization as a defensive response to criticism regarding Citizenship USA, it should
be noted that the INS contemplated such proceedings as early as May 1996, before
Citizenship USA was even completed. See Revocation of Naturalization, 61 Fed. Reg.
23,205, 23,209-10 (May 13, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 340 (2001)) (announcing INS
intent to specify an administrative process by which the Attorney General may reopen
naturalization applications). Yet, although the INS may have conceived the idea for
administrative denaturalization prior to the public outcry over Citizenship USA, it is likely
that public criticism of Citizenship USA significantly facilitated the final passage of the
administrative denaturalization scheme.
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trative revocation of citizenship. 35 Accordingly, it issued final regulations
establishing administrative denaturalization procedures on October 28,
1996.36
The final regulations promulgated in 1996 authorized the INS dis-
trict director with jurisdiction over the place of the individual's last
known residence to "reopen" naturalization proceedings within two years
after the grant of citizenship. 3 7 If the INS sought to denaturalize an indi-
vidual after two years of the original grant of citizenship, it would proceed
through a judicial determination under INA section 340(a) or (e) as de-
scribed above.3 8 If, however, the INS sought to denaturalize an individ-
ual within two years of the original grant of citizenship, the district direc-
tor could initiate administrative revocation proceedings upon obtaining
"credible and probative" evidence that the naturalization application had
been granted by mistake, or that was not known to the original naturaliz-
ing officer and would have had a material effect on the outcome of the
original decision to grant citizenship and would have proven either that
the application was based on fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment of
a material fact, or that the applicant was ineligible for naturalization. 39
Although not evident from the regulations, the district director
would in practice delegate responsibility to other staff members at the
district office. 40 Examinations officers, district counsels, and staff attor-
neys working under the district counsels became responsible for identify-
ing and reviewing cases in which citizenship might have been improperly
granted.4' Still, the district director would ultimately be required to sign
off on any decisions to revoke citizenship. 42 Examinations officers report
to the district director and are charged with various adjudicatory duties
including the approval of naturalization applications. 43 District counsels
and their staff attorneys serve as legal advisers to the district offices, and
district counsels represent the INS in various administrative proceedings
before immigration judges. 44 Consequently, they serve a prosecutorial
role. Unlike examinations officers, district counsels and their staff attor-
neys do not report to the district director. 45 Instead, they report to the
35. Revocation of Naturalization, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,550, 55,550-51 (Oct. 28, 1996)
(codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2001)) (interpreting the Immigration Act of
1990 as authorizing the Attorney General to correct, reopen, alter, modify, or vacate grants
of naturalization, a power which had previously rested exclusively within the discretion of
the courts).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 55,553.
38. Id. at 55,551.
39. Id. at 55,553.
40. Telephone Interview with David Martin, former INS General Counsel from
1995-1997 (Sept. 6, 2001).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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INS General Counsel and are thus in a chain of command distinct from
that of the district director.46 However, district counsels, their staff attor-
neys, district directors, and examinations officers are all members of the
INS and therefore lie directly in the chain of command of the INS
Commissioner. 47
If the district director (or the examinations officers and staff attor-
neys) determined that evidence existed to warrant revocation, she would
prepare a written notice of intent to revoke naturalization. 48 This notice
would include all of the evidence supporting revocation; it would also
inform the individual of his right to submit a response and request a
hearing.49 The individual would receive the notice by personal service,
and would be required to respond and/or request a hearing within sixty
days; failure to respond would be considered admission of the grounds
for reopening. 511
According to the regulations, the district director would then render
a written decision on the naturalization application, consisting of findings
of fact and law. 5 1 If the district director issued an adverse decision, the
individual would retain the right to appeal to the Office of Examinations,
Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) within thirty days. 52 The AAU consti-
tutes part of the INS and issues decisions through a single appellate ex-
aminer, who is usually not an attorney. 53 Appellate examiners conduct
their own research, with no legal staff support.54 If the AAU issued an-
other adverse decision, the individual could seek judicial review; the re-
viewing district court would review the issues of law and fact de novo. 55
The rules also provided that an individual retained citizenship until a fi-
nal adverse decision was rendered and all appeals had been declined or
exhausted. 56
The INS Statistical Yearbook does not provide the number of denatu-
ralizations per year.57 However, investigations into Citizenship USA indi-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Revocation of Naturalization, 8 C.F.R. § 340.1(b) (2) (2001).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 340.1(b) (4).
51. Id. § 340.1(d) (1).
52. Id. § 340.1(e)(1).
53. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 16, at 259; Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for
the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 Iowa L. Rev.
1297, 1317-18 (1986).
54. Legomsky, supra note 53, at 1317.
55. 8 C.F.R. § 340.1 (f) (providing for judicial review in accordance with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1421 (c)).
56. Id. § 3 4 0.1(g). But see infra notes 156-158 and accompanying text (suggesting
the possibility that an individual would not be entitled to retain citizenship until judicial
review in a federal district court) .
57. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 1998 Statistical Yearbook of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, at 168-98 (Nov. 2000), available at http://
www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/ 1998yb.pdf.
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cate that out of the nearly 1.1 million individuals naturalized during that
campaign, the INS sought to revoke the citizenship of 369 individuals
allegedly convicted of a felony or a crime of moral turpitude. 58 The in-
vestigations also determined that an additional 5,954 failed to reveal ar-
rests and would be subject to further review by the INS Office of General
Counsel for possible revocation.5 9 As of January 1, 1998, the INS had
reviewed 2,158 of these cases, and determined that 1,481 of those individ-
uals would be served with a notice of intent to revoke naturalization. 6°1
These revocations would be conducted through administrative
proceedings.6 1
Some distinctions between the 1996 administrative procedure and
the former judicial procedures are worth emphasizing. First, under the
1996 system, the INS district director, rather than a federal district judge,
would decide initially whether to revoke citizenship. 62 Second, the 1996
administrative system would place the burden of proof on the individual,
rather than on the government; also, citizenship could be revoked upon
the showing of mere "credible and probative" evidence that the grant of
naturalization was improper.6 3 In contrast, under the judicial denaturali-
zation regime, the government bore the burden to provide "clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing" evidence that the individual was not eligible for
naturalization at the time when citizenship was granted.64
58. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Press Release, INS and KPMG Complete
Review of August, 1995-September, 1996 Naturalizations (Feb. 9, 1998), at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1998/February/052.htm.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
59. Id.
60. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Fact Sheet: Process for Citizenship
Revocation (Feb. 9, 1998), available at http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/press/
ins/insl211.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
61. Memorandum from Dawn E. Johnsen, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, to the General Counsel, Immigration and Naturalization Serv. (Mar. 3,
1997), at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/ina340.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
("We understand that, if the INS institutes denaturalization proceedings with regard to any
of the naturalization cases approved between September 1995 and September 1996 that
are currently the subject of congressional investigation [i.e. cases approved during
Citizenship USA campaign], those proceedings will ordinarily be administrative.").
62. Revocation of Naturalization, 8 C.F.R. § 340.1(d) (1) (2001) ("The district director
shall render . . .a written decision on the reopened naturalization application ... )
(emphasis added).
63. Revocation of Naturalization, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,550, 55,554 (Oct. 28, 1996)
(codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2001)) (requiring that "the applicant bear the
burden of persuading the district director that, notwithstanding the evidence described in
the notice, the applicant was eligible for naturalization at the time of the order purporting
to admit the applicant to citizenship").
64. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 135 (1943); see also supra text
accompanying note 26.
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C. Gorbach v. Reno and 2000 Amendments
In 1998, a group of plaintiffs brought a nationwide class action suit
in federal district court challenging the validity of the 1996 regulations,
arguing that the INS did not possess the statutory authority to institute
denaturalization proceedings.65 Presumably in response to this pending
lawsuit, in March 2000 the INS issued interim rules amending the 1996
procedures for administrative denaturalization. Most significantly, these
amendments shifted the burden of persuasion from the individual back
to the government, and raised the burden of proof from "credible and
probative evidence" to "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence." 6 6
In this way, the 2000 rules for administrative denaturalization attempted
to conform to the judicial denaturalization requirement under Schneider-
man. However, the other departures from procedural norms in judicial
denaturalization cases remained.
Despite this amendment, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc affirmed
the preliminary injunction against administrative denaturalization, find-
ing that as a matter of statutory interpretation, the Immigration Act of
1990 did not authorize the INS to issue regulations establishing adminis-
trative denaturalization proceedings. 67 As the law stands today, the INS
does not possess the statutory authority to denaturalize aliens; the power
to revoke citizenship remains solely within the judiciary.
The INS did not petition for certiorari, and to date, Congress has not
issued the express statutory authority required to overcome the Gorbach
decision and institute administrative denaturalization proceedings. 68 Yet,
the possibility that it will do so in the future persists. Allegations of nonci-
tizen voter fraud may provide the political momentum to denaturalize
citizens administratively. For example, the narrow congressional victory
of Democrat Loretta Sanchez, who won the House seat representing the
46th District of California over Republican Robert Dornan by a close mar-
gin of 984 votes, fueled Republican allegations that Sanchez's victory was
attributable to voting by ineligible noncitizens. 69 Similarly, in Dallas, fed-
eral officials conducted an investigation to determine whether ineligible
65. Gorbach v. Reno, 181 F.R.D. 642, 650 (W.D. Wash. 1998) (granting plaintiffs'
motion for preliminary injunction to prevent INS from conducting administrative
denaturalization proceedings), aWd en banc, 219 F.3d 1087, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000).
66. Revoking Grants of Naturalization, 65 Fed. Reg. 17,127 (Mar. 31, 2000) (codified
at 8 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2001)).
67. Gorbach, 219 F.3d at 1091. For a thoughtful treatment of the factual background
to Gorbach and the court's statutory analysis, see Jon B. Hultman, Note, Administrative
Denaturalization: Is There "NothingYou Can Do That Can't Be [Un]Done?", 34 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 895 (2001).
68. Although Congress proposed such a bill, it was ultimately defeated. See supra
note 9.
69. Lizette Alvarez, Gingrich Intimates Growing Fraud in Sanchez Probe, L.A. Daily
News, Sept. 26, 1997, 1997 WL 4054227; Associated Press, Democrats Plan Filibuster to
Protest Sanchez Probe, L.A. Daily News, Oct. 25, 1997, 1997 WL 4057228,
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aliens cast ballots in the 1996 election.7 0 The same contentious political
climate inciting this suspicion is likely to give rise as well to suspicion that
aliens improperly obtain citizenship. Accusations of voting irregularities
are likely to fuel calls for an expedited procedure to revoke improper
grants of citizenship in the future.
Human rights activists may also, ironically, provide the political im-
petus to streamline denaturalization procedures. For example, the or-
ganization International Educational Missions, Inc. (IEM) seeks to iden-
tify and expel alleged foreign torturers and war criminals hiding in the
United States. Laudable and often successful, the group maintains a list
of 800 alleged human rights abusers currently living in the United States.
But from IEM's perspective the right to citizenship is not sacrosanct: the
"toughest issue is trying to revoke U.S. citizenship once it has been
granted." 7 1 Richard Krieger, IEM's president, cites the case of Eriberto
Mederos, accused of committing human rights abuses while in Cuba in
the 1970's.72 Human rights advocates pressured the government to de-
port him, but stumbled into procedural barricades. 73 In light of the frus-
tration engendered by the continuing presence of such individuals, it will
not be surprising if human rights activists campaign for a streamlined
process to denaturalize human rights abusers.
II. THREATS ASSOCIATED WITH ADMINISTRATIVE DENATURALIZATION
There has not been any significant debate on the benefits and costs
of administrative denaturalization. When the INS promulgated the 1996
rules instituting administrative denaturalization, it offered no substantive
justification for its action; instead, it mechanically suggested that the 1990
change in statutory language required this action. However, as the Ninth
Circuit found in Gorbach, Congressional records from the 1990 amend-
ment remain silent on the issue of whether administrative denaturaliza-
tion would or should be permitted.74 Consequently, neither the adminis-
trative notice and comment rulemaking procedure, nor congressional
records, provide any arguments in support of or against administrative
denaturalization.
Due to the absence of materials on the issue, we are left to speculate
why the INS, or anyone else for that matter, would favor the institution of
70. Frank Trejo & David LaGesse, Vote-Fraud Inquiry Triggers Controversy:
Immigrant Backers Charge Intimidation, but Others Defend Investigation at SMU, Dallas
Morning News, June 17, 1997, 1997 WL 11498396; see also Ruth Larson, Dallas Voter-
Fraud Probe Taken Out of Control of INS: Agency Had Halted Inquiry into Noncitizen
Registration, Wash. Times, June 10, 1997, at A3 (describing federal investigation to
determine whether noncitizens voted in Dallas elections).
71. Joseph Contreras, Looking for Bad Guys, Newsweek, Apr. 16, 2001, at 41; see also
US-Cuba Human Rights Group Wants to Strip Cuban of U.S. Citizenship, EFE News
Service, Inc., Apr. 2, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, GNW File.
72. Contreras, supra note 71, at 41.
73. Id.
74. Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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administrative denaturalization to supplement or supplant the current
system. Possible arguments in support of administrative denaturalization
may be drawn, however, from well established principles of administrative
law. First, one might favor administrative denaturalization because it en-
ables the agency to protect the integrity of its proceedings and correct its
mistakes.75 Because the INS now has the authority to grant citizenship, 76
it arguably must also have the power to revoke it when improperly
granted.
Second, traditional concerns for efficiency might counsel for a sys-
tem of administrative denaturalization. It is generally accepted that ad-
ministrative proceedings tend to be less expensive and time consuming
than litigation. In particular, agency reversals may be more efficient than
judicial reversals because the agency is already intimately familiar with the
record of the proceeding, has expertise in the field, and is better situated
than thejudiciary to determine whether it would have reached a different
conclusion but for the alleged grounds for revocation. 77
Finally, the INS may have preferred proceeding administratively be-
cause it viewed the procedural guarantees ofjudicial suits as excessive for
actions to correct mistaken grants of citizenship. 78 This position draws
some support from the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Gins-
berg, which stated: "No alien has the slightest right to naturalization un-
less all statutory requirements are complied with; and every certificate of
citizenship must be treated as granted upon condition that the Govern-
75. Dun & Bradstreet v. United States Postal Serv., 946 F.2d 189, 193 (2nd Cir. 1991)
("It is widely accepted that an agency may, on its own initiative, reconsider its interim or
even its final decisions, regardless of whether the applicable statute and agency regulations
expressly provide for such review."); Trujillo v. Gen. Elec. Co., 621 F.2d 1084, 1086 (10th
Cir. 1980) ("Administrative agencies have an inherent authority to reconsider their own
decisions, since the power to decide in the first instance carries with it the power to
reconsider."); United States v. Sioux Tribe, 616 F.2d 485, 493 (Ct. Cl. 1980) ("It is a well
established principle that an administrative agency may reconsider its own decisions. 'The
power to reconsider is inherent in the power to decide."' (citations omitted)); 2 K. Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise § 18.09 (1958) ("Every tribunal, judicial or administrative, has
some power to correct its own errors or otherwise appropriately to modify its judgment,
decree, or order.").
76. Immigration Act of 1990, 8 U.S.C. § 1421 (a) (1994) (conferring the authority to
grant citizenship on the Attorney General, who acts through the INS); see also Revocation
of Naturalization, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,550 (Oct. 28, 1996) (codified as amended at 8 C.F.R.
§ 340.1 (2001)) (interpreting the Immigration Act of 1990 to authorize the INS to grant
citizenship).
77. See Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. Celanese Corp., 650 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1981)
(describing pragmatic argument to permit administrative agency, rather than a federal
court, to reverse its own decision).
78. In support of this position, see Safeguarding the Integrity of the Naturalization
Process: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 40-41 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Doris
Meissner, Commissioner, INS) (describing new administrative denaturalization procedures
as permitting "INS to avoid sometimes cumbersome judicial denaturalization
procedures").
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ment may challenge it... and demand its cancellation unless issued in
accordance with such requirements.179 Perhaps the INS's policy is that
no fundamental rights are at stake when the government seeks to revoke
something that it deems to have been granted in error. Therefore, fewer
procedural protections are required than those guaranteed in a judicial
proceeding.
While the precise motivations behind the 1996/2000 regulations es-
tablishing administrative denaturalization procedures remain unclear,
generally accepted principles of administrative law provide some argu-
ments in support of the proposed system. Yet, without an adequate op-
portunity for debate, the substantial threats posed by administrative denat-
uralization have remained unvoiced. The following sections present
these arguments as a caution against administrative denaturalization.
Although proponents of administrative denaturalization may identify
some benefits to the system, this procedure raises its own problems. One
scholar criticizes administrative denaturalization as a threat to equal pro-
tection, due process, and separation of powers.80 He cites structural
weaknesses of the agencies, such as their vulnerability to political influ-
ence, to counsel against administrative denaturalization proceedings alto-
gether."' In a similar vein, this section identifies several factors warrant-
ing caution against administrative denaturalization: (1) the risk of
improper blending of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions; (2) the
risk that individual cases will improperly be used to advance broader pol-
icy goals; (3) the political vulnerability of administrative officials; and (4)
the lack of expertise and resources available to administrative bodies ad-
judicating fundamental rights. Each of these factors increases the likeli-
hood that an administrative revocation of citizenship will be in error, and
limits the individual's access to an impartial and competent
decisionmaker.
A. Improper Blending of Functions
First, administrative denaturalization poses the risk that the
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions will be improperly blended if
INS personnel retain responsibility for both functions. When a single
body performs both adjudicative and prosecutorial functions, conflicts of
interest that undermine the impartiality of decisions may arise and in-
crease the likelihood of mistaken findings of fact and law.8 2 However,
defenders of administrative adjudication point out that this conflict of
interest can be reduced if the system separates functions at the level of
individuals. Separation of functions at the agency level may be unneces-
79. 243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917) (setting aside a certificate of citizenship because it was
not issued upon a final hearing in open court as required by Congress).
80. Hultman, supra note 67, at 898.
81. Id. at 931.
82. See 2 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise
§ 9.9 (3d ed. 1994).
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sary.88 This suggests that the INS should be able to perform impartially
both prosecutorial and adjudicative roles involving denaturalization-as
long as different individuals perform these roles. Yet, the procedural re-
gime implemented by the 1996 rules (and left unchanged by the 2000
rules) failed to separate these functions even at the individual level. Al-
though denaturalization decisions were ultimately approved by the dis-
trict director,8 4 the district counsels and their staff attorneys, who ordina-
rily perform prosecutorial duties, played a primary role in advising the
district director on these adjudicatory decisions to denaturalize. 85
Past prosecutorial behavior in the denaturalization context demon-
strates how a blending of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions could
undermine the impartiality of the decisionmaker. In 1981 a case was
brought to denaturalize and extradite John Demjanjuk, alleged to be
"Ivan the Terrible," a notorious concentration camp guard. 86 In 1993, an
appellate court found that the Justice Department's prosecution withheld
evidence that directly contradicted the testimony of its key witness. 87 The
court vacated the denaturalization and extradition judgments on the
ground of "prosecutorial misconduct that constituted fraud on the
court."88 Onejudge even rebuked the prosecutors for "reckless disregard
for their duty." 9 The overzealous behavior of this prosecutor casts doubt
that this same individual could have acted as a neutral adjudicator in the
same case. To ensure an impartial decisionmaker in a denaturalization
suit, the prosecutorial functions must be separated from the adjudicative
functions.
B. Opportunistic Attempts to Further Policy Goals
Second, administrative denaturalization may provide an imprudent
opportunity for agency decisions to be guided by broader policy objec-
tives, at the expense of the appropriate legal disposition of an individual
case. This in turn increases the likelihood of improper revocations of
citizenship. Describing the tension between adjudication and administra-
83. Id.
84. See supra text accompanying note 42.
85. See supra text accompanying note 41.
86. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 339 (6th Cir. 1993); 135 Cong. Rec. 18,193
(1989) (statement of Hon. James A. Traficant, Jr.).
87. Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 342-44, 351.
88. Id. at 356. According to one report, the prosecution dumped the evidence in a
garbage can on K Street in Washington, D.C. 135 Cong. Rec. 18,193 (statement of Hon.
James A. Traficant, Jr.).
89. Robert L. Jackson, U.S. Renews Legal Fight to Deport Demjanjuk, L.A. Times,
May 20, 1999, at A5. It is interesting to note that in 1999, the INS reopened the case to
denaturalize Mr. Demjanjuk, alleging he was a concentration camp guard, albeit not "Ivan
the Terrible". Dep't ofJustice, Press Release, Justice Department Refiles Denaturalization'
Case Against Accused Nazi Death Camp GuardJohn Demjanjuk (May 19, 1999), at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1999/May/195crm.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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tion, one scholar writes: "Administrators are concerned with general ad-
ministrative programs, not with particularized inquiries."9ot
In fact, the INS's implementation of administrative denaturalization
demonstrates that it fell prey to this precise tension-it utilized the re-
gime as a vehicle to advance policy goals. Initially, the INS established a
policy limiting administrative denaturalization to clear cases in which fac-
tual disputes did not arise.9" Later, however, while testifying before mem-
bers of Congress shortly after the Citizenship USA debacle, then-INS
Commissioner Doris Meissner stated that the INS initiated and would
continue to initiate "revocation proceedings in less conclusive cases. '92
While conceding that administrative revocation in these cases presented
"unique obstacles" and "involve[d] a particularly unsettled area of law,"
Meissner testified that the INS would proceed with administrative revoca-
tion "in order to foster the development of favorable case law."'93 Simi-
larly, she described the policy goals underlying administrative denaturali-
zation: "By aggressively pursuing administrative revocation in
appropriate cases, . . . we are sending a clear message that only truly de-
serving individuals will be granted citizenship. '9 4 This evidence under-
scores the risk that administrative denaturalization will be used to ad-
vance broad policy goals, undermining the impartiality of decisions in
individual cases.
C. Vulnerability to Political Influence
Third, and related to the risk that they will be used as vehicles to
further policy goals, administrative proceedings threaten to politicize the
denaturalization process, increasing the likelihood that the individual's
citizenship will be revoked in error. 95 Because agency officials rely on the
executive and legislative branches for job security and funding, they re-
90. Jerry L. Mashaw, Organizing Adjudication: Reflections on the Prospect for
Artisans in the Age of Robots, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1055, 1056 (1992).
91. INS Finalizes Naturalization Revocation Regulations, 73 Interpreter Releases
1537, 1537-38 (Nov. 4, 1996) (quoting a cable sent by the INS to all its field offices (file
CO HQ 70/36) following the publication of the final rule); see also Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., Standards for Issuance of Notice of Intent to Reopen Naturalization
Proceedings and to Revoke Naturalization, reproduced in 74 Interpreter Releases 555, 555
(Mar. 28, 1997) ("In sum, administrative revocation is primarily designed for clear cases
where the individual was statutorily ineligible to naturalize and where the factual basis for
that finding does not depend on credibility determinations of witnesses testifying under
oath and subject to cross-examination."). In cases where factual disputes did arise, the
regulations directed the district director to proceed with judicial denaturalization instead.
Id. at 556 ("Where the applicant's answer to the notice ... raise[s] a genuine factual
issue . ..so that the resolution .. .will depend on the credibility of witnesses ..., the
district director must terminate the administrative revocation proceedings and determine
whether to refer the case for judicial revocation proceedings .
92. Hearing, supra note 78, at 41.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Hultman, supra note 67, at 931 (noting INS's susceptibility to political pressure).
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main vulnerable to political influence. 96 In contrast, federaljudges main-
tain a degree of political independence with salary and tenure protec-
tion. 97 Therefore, administrative adjudication poses the risk that
improper political considerations will enter the calculus for determina-
tions of citizenship revocation. This potential for political influence in
administrative decisions undermines the objective neutrality necessary to
afford the individual a fair procedure. In fact, politics has often driven
movements to denaturalize unpopular groups. Since the 1980s, most of
the high profile denaturalization cases have involved suspected Nazi war
criminals. 98 Similarly, in prior eras, cases to revoke citizenship on the
basis of Communist or Nazi sympathies or affiliations were not uncom-
mon.99 In light of this track record, it would not be surprising if denatu-
ralization were used in the future to target other politically disfavored
minority groups. This potential for politicization demonstrates the need
for a politically independent decisionmaker in denaturalization cases.
One might counter that this risk of political influence argues against
all administrative adjudication, yet we continue to tolerate administrative
decisionmaking in many other contexts. Nevertheless, the power to de-
naturalize remains uniquely vulnerable to political influence-the power
to denaturalize determines who will vote in elections. In Bindczyck v. Finu-
cane, the Supreme Court described this inextricable relationship between
denaturalization and politics.10 0 First, the Court discussed the origins of
the Act of 1906 codifying the government's power to denaturalize aliens,
noting that Congress formulated a "carefully safeguarded method" to
96. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss et al., Gellhorn & Byse's Administrative Law 193 (9th ed.
1995) ("Indeed, Congress and the President provide the primary direct check on the daily
conduct of federal administrative agencies .... Presidents and legislators can administer
systematic rewards and penalties; courts rarely can."); Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus,
Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 961, 1023 (1998)
("Administrators are often subject to political oversight, pressuring them to produce
desired results at the risk of their budgets or their jobs.").
97. See supra note 25.
98. See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 763-64 (1988) (involving an
attempt to denaturalize an alleged Nazi war criminal); Fedorenko v. United States, 449
U.S. 490, 493 (1981) (same); United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115, 116-17 (2nd Cir.
1985) (same); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1981)
(same).
99. See, e.g., Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 354-55 (1960) (rejecting
government attempt to revoke citizenship on the basis of failure to disclose Communist
party affiliation); Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660, 668 (1958) (rejecting government
attempt to revoke citizenship on the basis of Communist party affiliation); Knauer v.
United States, 328 U.S. 654, 668 (1946) (affirming circuit and district courts' revocation of
citizenship based on fraudulent information provided regarding Nazi affiliation);
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 677 (1944) (rejecting government's attempt to
denaturalize citizen accused of sympathizing with Nazis); Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943) (rejecting government attempt to revoke citizenship on the basis
of failure to disclose Communist party affiliation).
100. 342 U.S. 76, 81-82 (1951).
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minimize the risk of improper political motivations to denaturalize
aliens. 0 1 Then, it went on to state:
Indeed, the history of the Act of 1906 makes clear that elections
could be influenced by irregular denaturalizations as well as by
fraudulent naturalizations. The only instance in the extensive
legislative materials of vacation of naturalization orders by what
appears to have been the procedure urged by the Government
in this case involved just such a situation. Ajudge who had natu-
ralized seven aliens on the supposition that they were members
of his own political party promptly vacated his order when this
supposition was corrected. 10 2
To offset this risk of politicization, the Court held that state courts
could not revoke orders granting citizenship.1 0 3 Unlike federal judges,
many state judges are popularly elected and are thus subject to political
pressures similar to those imposed on agency officials. For the same rea-
sons that the Supreme Court denied state judges the authority to adjudi-
cate claims of citizenship, we should also be wary of permitting politically
vulnerable agency officials to adjudicate these claims.
The potential role of politics in motions to revoke citizenship be-
comes particularly apparent when considering the circumstances sur-
rounding the establishment of administrative denaturalization in 1996.
While the INS never officially articulated its motivation for establishing a
system of administrative denaturalization, one might fairly speculate that
the final decision to implement it can be at least partially attributed to
the political maelstrom surrounding the Citizenship USA campaign and
the 1996 elections. 10 4
Citizenship USA was an INS initiative to streamline the application
process and reduce backlogs of pending naturalization applications; it
succeeded in naturalizing 1.1 million aliens from September 1995 to Oc-
tober 1996. However, Republican opponents to the campaign accused
the Democratic administration of improperly naturalizing ineligible
aliens solely to create voters to support Democratic candidates. For ex-
ample, in a policy statement issued by the House Policy Committee,
Chairman Christopher Cox called the campaign "a blatant attempt to nat-
uralize a million prospective Clinton voters before the Presidential elec-
tion."10 5 One newspaper account even suggested that the INS was explic-
itly aware that ineligible aliens had become naturalized during the
Citizenship USA campaign, and that the INS retaliated against INS em-
ployees who objected to this practice. 10 6 An investigation conducted by
the Department ofJustice Office of the Inspector General acknowledged
101. Id. at 81.
102. Id. at 82-83
103. Id. at 85-88.
104. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
105. House Policy Committee, Policy Perspective, supra note 34.
106. Ruth Larson, Noncitizens Signed Up to Vote, Two Say: Workers Accuse INS of
Inaction, Wash. Times, Jan. 22, 1997, at A4. The article includes an INS employee's
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that the program "fueled speculation and media stories that the rush to
naturalize approximately one million applicants during fiscal year 1996
was an attempt to swell voting rolls with new citizens who were anticipated
to vote for Democratic candidates .... 1,,07 Although the report con-
cluded that Citizenship USA was not guided by electoral considera-
tions,'1 8 these statements indicate the political assault to which the INS
was subject during this period.
Simultaneously, Republicans led by House Speaker Newt Gingrich
blamed Democrat Loretta Sanchez's narrow congressional victory over in-
cumbent Robert Dornan on voting by noncitizens.' 0 9 After initiating an
investigation into these allegations of voter fraud, Republicans in the
House accused the INS of "stalling the investigation by failing to turn
over its records in a timely and complete fashion." 110 Although the INS
conceived of the idea of administrative denaturalization prior to these
events, I I I the scathing criticism it received in connection with Citizenship
USA and allegations of voter fraud in the 1996 elections likely provided
political will within the INS for final passage of the regulation instituting
administrative denaturalization. These events not only reveal the INS's
sensitivity to political criticism, but also its willingness to change its poli-
cies under political pressure. This vulnerability undermines the imparti-
ality required by a fair adjudicatory proceeding.
D. Fundamental Right at Stake
Fourth, another factor unique to the denaturalization context that
renders administrative denaturalization particularly unwise is that agen-
cies are ill-equipped to render determinations to revoke fundamental
rights.
Citizenship, once attained, constitutes a fundamental right. First, cit-
izenship is fundamental in the sense that it is important and highly re-
accusation that outreach agencies filled out voter registration cards for noncitizen resident
aliens, and states:
When [the INS employee] objected, INS managers encouraged the outreach
agencies to 'make unwarranted complaints against [her]'.... She was branded a
'rude and disgruntled employee' and removed from the outreach program,
'thereby allowing and encouraging the practice of these outreach agencies to
continue and showing all others what would happen to them if they objected to
the practice.'
Id.
107. Office of the Inspector Gen., Dep't of Justice, An Investigation of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service's Citizenship USA Initiative, Executive Summary 2
(July 31, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/cusarpt/execsum.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
108. Id. at 10.
109. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
110. See Alvarez, supra note 69.
111. Revocation of Naturalization, 61 Fed. Reg. 23,205, 23,209-10 (May 13, 1996)
(codified as amended at 8 C.F.R. § 340 (2001)) (stating INS's intent to specify a process of
administrative denaturalization).
1466 [Vol. 101:1448
2001] REVOKING YOUR CITIZENSHIP 1467
garded. The Supreme Court has often noted this, and recognized the
severe consequences of its revocation: "In its consequences it [denatural-
ization] is more serious than a taking of one's property, or the imposition
of a fine or other penalty.... It would be difficult to exaggerate its value
and importance."'"12
The right to citizenship is also fundamental in another sense-it pro-
vides the foundation from which other rights arise. In 1958, ChiefJustice
Warren wrote: "Citizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less than
the right to have rights. Remove this priceless possession and there re-
mains a stateless person, disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his coun-
trymen."' 13 In 1981 Justice Blackmun similarly characterized citizenship
as "a right conferring benefits of inestimable value upon those who pos-
sess it."'t14 For example, noncitizens remain ineligible to vote in federal
and most state and local elections. 115 In addition, noncitizens remain
vulnerable to being deported at any moment by congressional or execu-
tive fiat under the plenary power doctrine.' 16 For these reasons, citizen-
ship has consistently been recognized as a fundamental right.
Unfortunately, administrative agencies are ill-equipped to provide
the requisite procedural safeguards to protect this fundamental right, a
fact given credence by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Minker, the
INS attempted to subpoena naturalized individuals to testify in adminis-
trative hearings to determine whether the INS would institute judicial de-
naturalization proceedings against them. 1 7 The Supreme Court held
that the INS did not possess the authority for these subpoenas, stating:
112. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943); see also Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949) ("This Court has long recognized the plain fact
that to deprive a person of his American citizenship is an extraordinarily severe penalty.").
113. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64-65 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
114. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 522 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); see also Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 n.10 (1952) (describing
absence of "legal parity" between citizens and aliens, and pointing to aliens' ineligibility to
"stand for election to many public offices" and restrictions on aliens' right to travel); cf.
Maney v. United States, 278 U.S. 17, 22 (1928) (comparing naturalization to "other
instances of Government gifts" in that it is revocable); Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568,
578 (1926) (comparing naturalization to a public land grant or a patent); United States v.
Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 475 (1917) (holding that "every certificate of citizenship must be
treated as granted upon the condition that the Government may challenge it," and is
revocable if it is found that the individual in question did not fulfill the requirements for
citizenship); Alexander M. Bickel, Citizen or Person?: What is Not Granted Cannot Be
Taken Away, in The Morality of Consent 33, 33 (1975) ("Remarkably enough ... the
concept of citizenship plays only the most minimal role in the American constitutional
scheme.").
115. See generally, Virginia Harper-Ho, Non-Citizen Voting Rights: The History, Law,
and Current Prospects for Change, 18 Law & Ineq. 271 (2001) (analyzing history of
noncitizen suffrage in the United States).
116. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 586-89 (confirming that an alien, even one who has
resided in the United States for many years, continues to remain vulnerable to expulsion,
and finding decisions to deport "largely immune" from judicial review).
117. 350 U.S. 179, 181 (1956).
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"It does not bespeak deprecation of official zeal, nor does it bring into
question disinterestedness, to conclude that compulsory ex parte adminis-
trative examinations, untrammelled by the safeguards of a public adver-
sary judicial proceeding, afford too ready opportunities for unhappy con-
sequences to prospective defendants in denaturalization suits."' 18
Similarly, in Ng Fung Ho v. White, the INS attempted to deport indi-
viduals who claimed United States citizenship.' 19 The Supreme Court
held, however, that the INS did not possess the authority to deport indi-
viduals who are U.S. citizens and that the individuals were entitled to a
judicial determination of their citizenship claims before they could be
deported. 120 In reaching its decision that an administrative attempt to
deport an individual could not be effected without a judicial determina-
tion of the citizenship claim, it relied on "[t]he difference in security of
judicial over administrative action." 121
More recently, in Gorbach v. Reno, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc
held that the INS did not possess the authority to denaturalize individuals
in cases in which the propriety of the original grant of citizenship was
disputed, reasoning:
An administrative agency is useful for performing large numbers
of repetitive, routine tasks... such as naturalization, that do not
take away important liberties from individuals. But administra-
tive agencies, accustomed to treating a case as "one unit in a
mass of related cases," are dubious instruments for performing
relatively rare acts catastrophic to the interests of the individuals
on whom they are performed. 22
These statements express doubt that administrative proceedings can
provide adequate safeguards to protect sufficiently the fundamental right
to citizenship in cases in which that right is disputed.
Not only have courts exhibited suspicion regarding the level of pro-
cedural protection that can be afforded in administrative proceedings,
they have also held that the procedural protections afforded in ordinary
judicial proceedings prove inadequate to protect this fundamental right.
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has imposed procedural protec-
tions in denaturalization proceedings above and beyond the normal re-
quirements in civil suits. For example, in Schneiderman v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that the preponderance of evidence standard used
in ordinary civil trials would not suffice in denaturalization suits.' 23
Rather, the Court imposed on the government the strict burden to show
118. Id. at 188.
119. 259 U.S. 276, 282 (1922).
120. Id. at 284-85.
121. Id.
122. 219 F.3d 1087, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted).
123. 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943). For a discussion of Schneiderman, see also supra notes
26-28 and accompanying text.
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through "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence that the individ-
ual was improperly naturalized.1 24
Similarly, in Klapprott v. United States, the Court prohibited default
judgments in denaturalization cases although they are routinely permit-
ted in other civil cases. 125 The government instituted a suit to denatural-
ize the petitioner and when the petitioner failed to answer the complaint,
a federal district court entered a default judgment revoking citizenship.
However, the Supreme Court set aside this default judgment, holding
that default judgments would not be permitted for denaturalization
cases.1 26 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the signifi-
cance of the right to citizenship requires procedural protections above
and beyond those provided in ordinary civil trials: "Denaturalization con-
sequences may be more grave than consequences that flow from convic-
tion for crimes.... Because denaturalization proceedings have not fallen
within the technical classification of crimes is hardly a satisfactory reason
for allowing denaturalization without proof while requiring proof to sup-
port a mere money fine or a short imprisonment. '" 12 7 Justice Rutledge's
concurrence in the same case went even further to suggest that the full
range of procedural protections required in criminal trials should apply
to actions to revoke citizenship. 128
These opinions adopt the position that the fundamental nature of
the right to citizenship, and the severity of its revocation, require proce-
dural safeguards above and beyond those provided in ordinary civil suits.
If the procedural requirements of civil actions prove too inadequate to
safeguard the right to citizenship, then the procedural requirements of
administrative proceedings will likely prove even less adequate.
Each of these risks-the improper blending of prosecutorial and ad-
judicatory functions, the improper consideration of broad policy goals at
124. 320 U.S. at 125 (citation omitted).
125. 335 U.S. 601, 610-12 (1949).
126. Id. at 615.
127. Id. at 611-12.
128. Id. at 616-17, 619 (Rutledge, J., concurring). In his opinion, Justice Rutledge
notes the connection between denaturalization and "banishment" or "exile." Id. at 616-17
("Yet by the device or label of a civil suit, carried forward with none of the safeguards of
criminal procedure. . . ,this most comprehensive and basic right of all, so it has been held,
can be taken away and in its wake may follow the most cruel penalty of banishment.").
Although denaturalization does not necessarily lead to deportation, it appears likely that in
practice the INS will exercise its prosecutorial discretion to bring suit only in those cases in
which the alien will finally be deported. See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
Fact Sheet: Prosecutorial Discretion Guidelines 2 (Nov. 28, 2000), at http://
www.ins.usdj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/factsheets/Prosecut.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (listing "[1] ikelihood of ultimately removing the alien" as one factor
to use in determining whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion); INS, Operations
Instructions 340.1, supra note 17 (stating that the INS will not seek to revoke citizenship if
it is satisfied that "if denaturalized the person would not become deportable and that a new
petition for naturalization would be granted"). These sources suggest that any action for
denaturalization will always be followed by an action for deportation.
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the expense of consideration of a fair disposition in the individual case,
vulnerability to politicization, and the fundamental nature of citizen-
ship-counsels against administrative revocation of citizenship. The next
section proposes minimum procedural requirements that seek to miti-
gate some of these risks associated with administrative denaturalization,
arguing that these safeguards must be provided if we are to tolerate ad-
ministrative denaturalization at all.
III. SAFETY VALVE-A PRESCRIPTION FOR PROCEDURALLY SOUND
ADMINISTRATIVE DENATURALIZATION
This Note counsels against any system of administrative denaturaliza-
tion. Yet, the reinstitution of administrative denaturalization remains a
distinct possibility. 129 In apprehension of such a situation, this section
proposes a set of procedural safeguards to minimize the risks associated
with these proceedings. Administrative denaturalization must provide for
impartial adjudicators. In the first instance, immigration judges, rather
than district directors, should render denaturalization decisions. In the
second instance, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) rather than the
Administrative Appeals Unit (AAU) should review denaturalization deci-
sions on appeal. Finally, a federal districtjudge should review de novo an
adverse decision by the BIA. In addition to providing for an impartial
decisionmaker, administrative denaturalization proceedings must impose
a strict burden of proof on the government. These procedural mecha-
nisms will reduce the likelihood of a mistaken revocation of citizenship.
A. Impartial Decisionmakers
1. District Directors Versus Immigration Judges. - Some of the risks asso-
ciated with administrative denaturalization could be mitigated by delegat-
ing the authority to denaturalize individuals in the first instance to immi-
gration judges rather than INS officials. The 1996/2000 regime of
administrative denaturalization delegated the denaturalization authority
to render these decisions to the district director, who would in turn dele-
gate to examinations officers and district counsels and their staff attor-
neys the duty of identifying and reviewing suspect cases.' 30
The designation of these officials, rather than some other adminis-
trative official such as an immigration judge, to make these decisions
compromises the impartiality of the decisionmaking process in two sub-
stantial ways. First, district counsels and their staff attorneys maintain
both adjudicative and prosecutorial functions for any given denaturalization
case, an improper blending of functions.13 ' Second, because the district
directors, examinations officers, and district counsels and their staff attor-
neys are all part of the INS, there is an increased likelihood that they will
129. See supra notes 9, 68-73 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
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be guided by broader policy goals of the agency at the expense of the
appropriate legal disposition in the given case. In fact, as noted above,
this is precisely what occurred shortly after the Citizenship USA cam-
paign-the INS intentionally adjudicated cases in which the law was un-
clear in order to push the law in a direction favoring agency policy
goals.' 32 For these reasons, the designation of these officials to deter-
mine whether an individual's citizenship will be revoked undermines the
impartiality of the decisionmaker.
Delegation of the denaturalization authority to another administra-
tive official-an immigration judge-would improve the impartiality of
the decisionmaking process. First, this situation would not pose the prob-
lem of improper blending of functions. Immigration judges, unlike dis-
trict directors and district counsels and staff attorneys, perform only adju-
dicative and no enforcement or prosecutorial functions. If the system
assigned the adjudicatory denaturalization function to an immigration
judge, then the individual who renders the decision on denaturalization
(immigration judge) would be different from the individuals who enforce
and prosecute (district director, district counsels, and staff attorneys).
This in turn would reduce the conflict of interest that arises when the
same person is responsible for both prosecuting and adjudicating a single
case, improving the decisionmaker's impartiality.
Second, this would reduce the risk that individual cases would be
improperly used to advance broader policy goals. Immigration judges are
subject to a chain of command separate from the INS-they are account-
able to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). In 1983,
the Justice Department removed immigration judges from the purview of
the INS and placed them in the newly created EOIR to ensure that adju-
dicatory decisions by these individuals were insulated from the enforce-
ment pressures of the INS.13 3 Although both the INS and the EOIR are
ultimately accountable to the Attorney General, the separation of the
EOIR from the INS insulates it from the direct policy pressures con-
fronting the INS.
Therefore, to ensure the adequate separation of prosecutorial and
adjudicative functions and to reduce the risk that individual decisions will
be improperly used to advance broader policy goals, any system of admin-
istrative denaturalization should permit immigration judges, rather than
INS officials, to render decisions in the first instance. However, while
delegating decisions to immigration judges presents an improvement
from delegating them to INS officials, the case should not be overstated;
immigration judges are still not totally independent, especially since they
lack the tenure and salary protection of Article III judges.
2. Administrative Appeals Unit Versus Board of Immigration Appeals.
The 1996 and 2000 systems of administrative denaturalization granted in-
132. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
133. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 16, at 256.
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dividuals a right to appeal an initial adverse decision to the AAU. How-
ever, the AAU is ill-equipped to make determinations regarding the revo-
cation of fundamental rights such as citizenship. With little legal
background, no legal staff support, and a single examiner deciding
cases, 13 4 AAU decisions are particularly vulnerable to mistakes of law
which would prove devastating to the individual who would be denatural-
ized. Another problem presented by assigning the appellate authority to
the AAU is that appellate examiners are housed within the INS itself, in-
creasing the likelihood that they will commit errors of law in the interest
of furthering broader policy goals of the INS. 135 For these reasons, dele-
gating the appellate denaturalization power to the AAU confronts at least
two of the threats associated with administrative denaturalization.
One solution that might reduce these negative effects would be to
grant appellate jurisdiction over denaturalization cases to the BIA rather
than the AAU. Both the BIA and the AAU determine appeals in the im-
migration and naturalization context.' 36 However, unlike decisions ren-
dered by the AAU, BIA cases are determined by a three-member panel of
attorneys.' 3 7 Also, members of the BIA are assisted by a staff of twenty-
four attorneys.3" These characteristics suggest that the quality of opin-
ions rendered by the BIA is superior to those rendered by the AAU.' 39
Appointing the BIA to exercise appellate power in denaturalization cases
would thus improve the legal competence of the decisionmaking body
rendering determinations regarding this fundamental right.
Appointing the BIA rather than the AAU to exercise appellate au-
thority will also reduce the likelihood that individual decisions will be
improperly used to advance broader policy goals without regard for the
legal merits of the given case. The BIA, unlike the AAU, but like immi-
gration judges, is housed within the EOIR rather than the INS. Conse-
quently, members of the BIA are less susceptible to the policy pressures of
the INS. Their decisions are therefore less likely to contain mistakes of
law in the interest of pursuing broader policy goals.
Each of these characteristics suggests that delegating the appellate
denaturalization authority to the BIA, rather than the AAU, will help en-
sure that the case is reviewed by a competent and relatively impartial deci-
sionmaker. Of course, like immigration judges, members of the BIA,
without tenure and salary protection, are not as independent as Article
134. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that the
appellate examiners enjoy one advantage over district counsels and staff attorneys, who
advise the district director-appellate examiners do not prosecute the cases they
adjudicate. Therefore, there is a reduced risk of an improper blending of functions.
136. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 16, at 259.
137. Id. at 258; see also Legomsky, supra note 53, at 1317.
138. Legomsky, supra note 53, at 1317.
139. Id. at 1318.
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IIjudges. Still, the replacement of the AAU with the BIA in a system of
administrative denaturalization would constitute an improvement.
Skeptics might point to the increasing caseload of the BIA to object
to this proposal. In 1984, the Board received fewer than 3,000 new ap-
peals and motions. In 1998, however, over 28,000 new appeals and mo-
tions were filed. 140 Since 1984, the number of BIA members has in-
creased from five to the current nineteen board members, with
accompanying staff increases. "41 It nevertheless remains possible that this
board member increase will prove insufficient to accommodate BIA re-
view of denaturalization appeals. Yet, even if this is the case, the funda-
mental nature of citizenship counsels for a further increase in the num-
ber of BIA members, rather than the removal of denaturalization appeals
from BIA review.
Another potential problem with BIA review of denaturalization ap-
peals arises from the recent decision to streamline the BIA appellate re-
view procedure. In October 1999, the Department of Justice issued a fi-
nal rule permitting a single BIA member to summarily affirm the decision
of an immigration judge in certain circumstances without issuing a writ-
ten opinion. 142 This may undermine some of the benefits of BIA review:
The replacement of the three-member panel with a single decisionmaker
and the absence of a reasoned opinion may compromise the quality of
BIA decisions.' 43 In light of the increased risk of error, this Note pro-
poses that appeals from denaturalization orders be exempt from the new
BIA streamlined procedures and instead remain subject to the standard
three-member panel written opinion. 144
140. Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals:
Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135, 56,136 (Oct. 18, 1999) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.1
(2001)).
141. Id. at 56,139.
142. Id. at 56,136.
143. See Philip G. Schrag, The Summary Affirmance Proposal of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, 12 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 531, 534 (1998) (arguing that the absence of
written opinions will compromise the quality of BIA decisions); see also Executive Office
for Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. at
56,137-39 (describing criticisms of one-member summary affirmances and noting due
process concerns raised by this change).
144. Even if denaturalization appeals were not exempt from the streamlined
procedures, the extent to which these appeals would actually be summarily affirmed
remains unclear. Under the new rule, the streamlined one-member summary affirmance
is used only where:
(1) the result reached in the decision under review was correct; (2) any errors in
the decision under review were harmless or nonmaterial; and (3) either (a) the
issue on appeal was squarely controlled by existing Board or federal court
precedent and did not involve the application of such precedent to a novel fact
situation; or (b) the factual and legal questions raised on appeal were so
insubstantial that three-Member review was not warranted.
Executive Office of Immigration Review, Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 64
Fed. Reg. at 56,136. Further, even if this summary affirmance were actually applied to a
denaturalization appeal and would reduce the increased procedural safeguards that
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3. De Novo Judicial Review. - While delegating decisionmaking to an
immigration judge in the first instance and the BIA in the second in-
stance reduces the risk of political influence, it does not eliminate the
threat completely. Although immigration judges and the BIA are sepa-
rated from the chain of command of the INS, as executive officials they
still ultimately remain subject to the attorney general's authority. Indeed,
they also receive their funding from the executive branch. 45 Therefore,
as suggested above, while immigration judges and members of the BIA
may not be vulnerable to the political pressure directed at the INS specifi-
cally, they may still face political pressure directed at the executive and
legislative branches more generally.
A procedural safeguard, however, could remedy this weakness-the
provision of de novo judicial review. Without this provision, a federal
district court reviewing an agency decision would probably be required to
accord deference to the administrative findings of fact and law. 14 6 This,
however, would expose the process to the risk that findings of fact and
law, which may have been unduly influenced by political considerations,
will be affirmed without adequate reconsideration. With de novojudicial
review, however, the final decisionmaker would be an Article III judge
with salary and tenure protection. This independent decisionmaker
would not need to defer to the agency's potentially biased findings, but
would rather determine the case as though it had never been presented
before another body.
In fact, the Constitution, while somewhat unclear on this point, may
require a provision for de novojudicial review. 14 7 In NgFungHo v. White,
the government attempted to deport five individuals, two of whom
claimed United States citizenship, through executive proceedings under
the Chinese Exclusion Act. 148 In a unanimous opinion the Supreme
Court held that the two individuals were entitled to a judicial determina-
tion of their citizenship claim before the government could deport them.
The Court suggested that the Due Process Clause requires this judicial
determination, noting the "difference in security ofjudicial over adminis-
trative action."1 49 Concededly, this case involved a governmental attempt
characterize BIA appeals, it would not eviscerate them completely, because the BIA
member would still have the advantage of being an attorney with staff support. See supra
notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
145. Aleinikoff et al., supra note 16, at 256-57.
146. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (holding that in cases of ambiguity, agency interpretations of law may be granted
deference by the reviewing court); see also Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 522
U.S. 359, 366 (1998) (affirming use of deferential substantial evidence test to agency
findings of fact).
147. See, e.g., Verkuil, supra note 5, at 1166 (arguing that in consideration of the
fundamental nature of the right to citizenship, due process requires maximum procedural
protections, and stating that "[a] federal district court trial, conducted by a judge of
unquestioned impartiality ... may be a constitutional necessity").
148. 259 U.S. 276, 277-82 (1922).
149. Id. at 284-85.
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to deport an individual, not an attempt to denaturalize one. Nevertheless,
this rationale to require a judicial determination of citizenship prior to
an administrative deportation could be applied by analogy to argue that
all determinations of citizenship must be subject to de novo judicial
review.' 50
Still, one might argue that even if some degree of judicial review is
required, de novo review is not; perhaps a "substantial justification" stan-
dard of review of agency findings of fact and law would suffice. In Ng
Fung Ho, however, the Court did not hold that a reviewing court could
defer to the agency's determination of noncitizenship implicit in the ad-
ministrative decision to deport. Rather, the Supreme Court required the
reviewing court to make determinations on its own.7
Arguably, the provision of de novo review undermines one of the
presumed purposes of administrative denaturalization-efficiency-and
imposes an additional step in the procedure to revoke an individual's
citizenship. This might waste judicial resources by encouraging meritless
appeals, which would provide the individual with "another bite at the ap-
ple," and extend the length of her citizenship. However, the argument
that individuals will appeal meritless claims may overstate the case. For
example, disciplinary measures exist to sanction attorneys or unrepre-
sented parties who bring frivolous claims. 152 Further, the risk of meritless
appeals is insufficient to outweigh the severe consequences of a mistaken
revocation of citizenship, the high risk of politicized agency decisions,
and the constitutional concerns raised by the absence of de novo judicial
review. 153 Therefore, any system of administrative denaturalization
should provide for de novo judicial review of agency decisions to revoke
citizenship. 15 4
150. In fact, the INS's stated policy to pursue denaturalization only in those cases
where the individual will likely be deported, supra note 128, underscores the strength of
this analogy.
151. NgFung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284-85.
152. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (providing for sanctions against attorneys or
unrepresented parties who present frivolous arguments before a court).
153. See, e.g., Hultman, supra note 66, at 898, 930-35 (identifying due process, equal
protection and separation of powers concerns raised by administrative denaturalization);
see also supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
154. The "constitutional fact review" doctrine may also provide an argument by
analogy in favor of de novo review. This doctrine authorizes independent appellate review
of facts implicating certain constitutional rights. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501-11 (1984) (requiring independent review of mixed
questions of law and fact in the context of the First Amendment); Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 60 (1932) (requiring de novo review of "jurisdictional facts"); Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 237-39 (1985) ("Constitutional fact
review presupposes that appellate courts will render independent judgments on any issues
of constitutional 'law' presented. Its distinctive feature is a requirement of similar
independent judicial judgment on issues of constitutional law 'application."'); Judah H.
Schechter, Note, De Novo Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Factual
Determinations Implicating Constitutional Rights, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1483, 1484 (1988)
(discussing the requirement for independent appellate review of constitutional facts).
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Accepting the necessity of de novo review, one might still argue that
this guarantee of de novo review obviates the need for the immigration
judge and the BIA in the denaturalization process. Under this view, even
if the district director and the AAU are susceptible to making mistakes,
these mistakes become harmless because they will eventually be corrected
by a district court. However, this position relies on two questionable
assumptions.
First, it assumes that individuals in the process of denaturalization
suffer no harm until their citizenship is actually revoked. In fact, in the
interim between receipt of a notice of intent to denaturalize and the de
novo district court trial, the individual is likely to undergo great stress and
inconvenience. Further, an initial decision to denaturalize injures an in-
dividual's dignity. At worst, it brands the individual as a fraud; at best, it
sends a message of exclusion, characterized by a "you are not worthy of
being one of us" mentality. In United States v. Zucca, the Supreme Court
recognized: "The mere filing of a proceeding for denaturalization results
in serious consequences to a defendant. Even if his citizenship is not
cancelled, his reputation is tarnished and his standing in the community
damaged."15 5 A correct decision, prior to a district court hearing, re-
lieves the individual of these adverse effects.
Second, the position assumes that the individual retains citizenship
until a final adverse decision by an Article III district court. However, it
was unclear whether this was in fact the case under the 1996/2000 re-
gime. The regulations did provide that the individual retained citizen-
ship until a final adverse decision was rendered and all appeals had been
declined or exhausted.1 56 However, the regulations could not authorize
district court jurisdiction to review the case prior to the revocation of citi-
zenship because only Congress, not agencies, possesses the power to au-
thorize jurisdiction. 157 Congress, however, failed to authorize federal
courts to exercise jurisdiction over administrative "reopenings" of appli-
cations to naturalize.15 8 This failure suggests that district courts do not
retain jurisdiction to review administrative revocations of naturalization
Unlike citizenship acquired through birth on United States soil, citizenship acquired by
naturalization does not technically present a constitutional right because it is granted
through statute, not by the Constitution. Still, the fundamental nature of this right,
recognized by the judiciary, suggests that courts reviewing denaturalization decisions
should impose the same degree of scrutiny as is imposed in cases implicating constitutional
rights such as the First Amendment.
155. 351 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1956).
156. Revocation of Naturalization, 8 C.F.R. § 340.1 (g) (2), (4) (2001).
157. Richard H. Fallon et al., Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and The Federal
System 348-49 (4th ed. 1996) (describing exclusive authority of Congress to apportion
jurisdiction of Article III lower federal courts).
158. Rather, the relevant section of the statute suggests that courts only retain
jurisdiction to revoke and set aside a grant of citizenship on the grounds of illegal
procurement or concealment of a material fact or willful misrepresentation, Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 § 340(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1994), or to revoke, set aside,
and declare void a grant of citizenship upon the individual's conviction under section 1425
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while the individual still retains citizenship. This interpretation under-
scores the need for an accurate decision at the administrative level prior
to revocation, which is only subsequently subject to judicial review on spe-
cific grounds. 15 9
B. Strict Burden of Proof on the Government
Finally, to reduce the likelihood of error in determinations to revoke
citizenship, any system of administrative denaturalization must continue
to place the burden of persuasion on the government. The government,
in turn, must be required to provide evidence that satisfies a "clear, une-
quivocal, and convincing" standard, as dictated by Schneiderman.' 60 As
discussed above, the Supreme Court reasoned that this strict burden of
proof was required to protect the fundamental right to citizenship.1 6 1 In-
deed, because administrative decisionmakers are more vulnerable to po-
litical pressures than judges, the possibility that the "political temper of
majority thought and the stresses of the times" 162 will improperly influ-
ence the disposition of denaturalization cases is even greater in the ad-
ministrative context. Therefore, the requirements for a strict standard of
proof and the imposition of the burden of persuasion on the government
are even more necessary in the context of administrative denaturalization
than they are in the context of judicial denaturalization.
This strict burden of proof on the government is related to the re-
quirement for de novojudicial review; both mechanisms mitigate the risk
that citizenship will be revoked in error. The requirement for a strict
burden of proof diminishes the likelihood that the agency, faced with
political and institutional pressures, will denaturalize too eagerly with in-
adequate proof. The requirement of de novo judicial review ensures that
if the agency does denaturalize without adequate proof, then the rela-
tively independent judiciary can correct this mistake.
CONCLUSION
As public suspicion surrounding new citizens continues, legislators,
courts, and administrative agencies must confront the possibility of imple-
menting a system of administrative denaturalization. Such a system
of Title 18 for knowingly procuring naturalization in violation of law. Id. § 340(e), 8
U.S.C. § 1451 (e).
159. The INS did attempt to provide for judicial de novo review in the 1996 and 2000
systems of administrative denaturalization. If a new system of administrative
denaturalization is introduced, Congress must explicitly provide for this procedural
protection.
160. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 135 (1943). It should be noted
that this standard of proof and persuasion provides even stricter protection for the
individual than that required in most civil proceedings; in fact, it approximates the
standard required in criminal proceedings.
161. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
162. Scheiderman, 320 U.S. at 159.
20011 1477
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
would present a dramatic break from long standing tradition, permitting
INS officials-bureaucrats-to revoke an individual's citizenship.
This Note urges those who will be confronted with the decision to
consider the factors counseling against administrative denaturalization.
Such a system would present the risks that the adjudicatory and
prosecutorial/enforcement functions are improperly blended; that ad-
ministrative officials will view the individual case as an opportunity to fur-
ther broader policy goals at the expense of the individual's legal rights in
a given case; that the decision will be unduly influenced by political con-
siderations; and that the system will be ill-equipped to make determina-
tions regarding the fundamental right of citizenship. If we are to accept
such an administrative proceeding at all, we must ensure that procedural
safeguards are in place, sufficient to protect the interests of the individu-
als subject to such proceedings. These minimum requirements include:
the right to an impartial decisionmaker and competent appellate body;
the right to de novo appeal before a federal district court; and the place-
ment of a "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" burden of proof on the
government. These safeguards will enhance the protection of citizens
who are subjected to administrative denaturalization procedures and, in
the process, they will protect the sanctity of citizenship for all of us.
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